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Introduction
For over twenty years, cable operators have attempted to place
their cables on, over, and under as much of this country as they could
in order to be able to serve as many television watchers as possible.
The question as to whether the cable operator could place its cables
over private property and within utility easements has been placed
before both state and federal courts on many occasions. The answer to
this question often depended on what theory and upon which state's
law the cable operator attempted to base its request.
Over ten years ago, with the enactment of the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984,1 Congress attempted to provide
franchised cable operators with a federal right of access to easements.
Whether cable operators have been more successful under common
law, state property theories, or under the Cable Act is debatable.
More importantly, it is questionable whether the Cable Act has
actually provided cable operators with any additional rights that they
did not have prior to the passage of the Act. Additionally, it appears
that there is even some question as to how to properly interpret the
access provision of the Cable Act.
The Cable Act was enacted in 1984 in order to update the law to
keep pace with the advances of cable communications technology.
Prior to the passage of the Cable Act, no uniform regulatory scheme
was in place to properly regulate the cable television industry and to
ensure its growth and development to best serve the viewing public.2
The final form of the Cable Act was the result of negotiations and
compromises between representatives of those who would regulate the
cable industry (the franchising authorities) and those who would be
regulated (the cable operators). The result of such intense negotiations
was detailed legislation that attempted to cover many significant
1. 47 U.S.C. § 541 (1994). The enactment of the 1992 Cable Act had no effect on this
particular section of the 1984 Cable Act.
2. As early as 1970, the FCC recognized that "actions have been taken in the cable field
without any overall plan as to the Federal-local relationship." Notice of Proposed Rule Making
in Docket 18892, 22 F.C.C.2d 50 (1970). The FCC later stated that "[c]able television is an
emerging technology that promises a communications revolution. Inevitably, our regulatory
pattern must evolve as cable evolves-and no one can say what the precise dimensions will be."
Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 210 (1972).
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aspects of the cable industry, ranging from franchising to renewal to
equal employment practices to subscribers' privacy.
3
As part of its continuing rulemaking under the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,4 and with the
enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,5 the Federal
Communications Commission has sought comments on the status of
the law for cable operators seeking access to private property The
FCC is reviewing the status of cable operators' access in conjunction
with its rulemaking on inside wiring. The FCC stated that:
Parity of access rights to private property may be a necessary
predicate for any attempt to achieve parity in the rules governing
cable and telephone network inside wiring, because without access
to the premises, the inside wiring rules and proposals discussed in
this NPRM will not even be implicated. An inequality in access can




Since before the passage of the Cable Act, in order to try to gain
access to potential subscribers cable operators have utilized easements
by claiming that the easement is "apportionable," meaning that it is
compatible for cable use and that use will not place an additional
burden on the servient estate. For instance, in Clark v. El Paso
Cablevision, Inc.,8 several homeowners appealed an order temporarily
enjoining them from interfering with a cable operator's use of a utility
pole and easement for the overhanging of its wires, including the right
of ingress and egress located at the rear of their property. The
franchise granted to the cable operator contained a provision
providing the grantee the authority to contract with any public utility
3. The Cable Act "is a long and complicated statute," containing 28 different sections,
covering virtually every aspect of cable regulation. Michael I. Meyerson, The Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984: A Balancing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. Rav. 543,
545 (1985). "The key to understanding it is to recognize that it is above all else, a compromise."
Id. (emphasis added).
4. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992)(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-558
(1994))[hereinafter 1992 Cable Act].
5. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)(to be codified at scattered sections of 18 and 43
U.S.C.).
6. In re Telecommunications Services Inside Wiring, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CS
Docket No. 95-184, 11 FCC Rcd. 2747 (1995).
7. Id. at 2774, 1 61. "NPRM" is an acronym for "Notice of Proposed Rule-Making."
8. 475 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
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company lawfully having poles in the streets, alleys, or public grounds
of the city and to use such poles for its cables and necessary
equipment. Under the terms of the franchise, El Paso Electric
Company granted to Cablevision the right to attach its cables and
equipment to the utility company's poles. Cablevision placed coaxial
cable on the power company's pole located on the private
homeowners' property. Thereafter, the homeowners demanded that
Cablevision remove the cable. The trial court entered a temporary
injunction restraining the homeowners from interfering with
Cablevision's use of the utility pole? The Court of Civil Appeals of
Texas held that the city "[aicting for the public . . . allowed the
Plaintiff [Cablevision] the use of the easement. Plaintiff's right to the
use of the easement comes from the dedication, and its rights to use
the poles comes from the Electric Company." 
10
Similarly, in Salvaty v. Falcon Cable Television," the issue was
whether a telephone company and a cable operator had to secure a
private property owner's consent before cable equipment was installed
on a telephone pole situated on the telephone company's easement on
the property. In 1926, the property owner conveyed an easement
"over, across and upon the rear five (5) feet of the premises" for the
construction of a pole for telephone, light and power lines.'2 In 1979,
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company entered into a license
agreement to permit Falcon to place its equipment "in or on Pacific's
conduit system and telephone poles." 13 In 1980, the City of Alhambra
awarded a franchise to Falcon to provide cable service within the city's
limits. The city also adopted an ordinance making it unlawful for any
private property owner to interfere with a cable operator's access to
private property.
The court found that section 767.5 of the California Public
Utilities Code shows a "strong public policy in favor of encouraging
the type of cable attachments involved in this case."'14 Additionally,
upon a legal analysis of the type of easement granted, the court held
9. Id.
10. Id. at 577. See also White v. Detroit Edison Co., 263 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
11. 212 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
12. Id. at 32.
13. Id. at 33.
14. Id. at 34. See also Witteman v. Jack Barry Cable TV, 228 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
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that the installation of Falcon's equipment was proper.15 Similarly, the
court in Cousins v. Alabama Power Co.,16 noted that "[t]he question of
apportionment of easements by utility companies has been raised most
recently around the country in cases involving cable television. Many
courts have found that utility companies are authorized to share or
apportion their easement rights with a third party, without obtaining
the permission of, or compensating the owner of, the servient
estate."'7
Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to
review an action brought by a cable operator seeking access to the
premises of a planned unit development.18 The cable operator sought
access under the federal Cable Act, a West Virginia statute, and a
claim of apportionment of easements. The trial court had rejected all
three claims by the operator. Under the apportionment claim, the
appellate court held that the operator could utilize the easement
previously granted to the electric company some 35 years earlier in
order to string wire. The court stated that "[t]he fact that an additional
wire would be introduced to the many others on the poles does not
impose any meaningful increase of burden on Shannondale's [the
property owner's] interest in the underlying property."'9 Moreover,
the court noted that the landowner's president had conceded before
the trial court that the additional wire of the cable operator "is not a
concem."
' 0
The cable operator must look to its state's common law to ensure
that apportionment exists there. Then, it must analyze the plats and
surveys of the property it seeks to lay its cables over to ensure that a
utility exists. Finally, the operator should check with the utility that
was granted the easement to ensure that it does not object to the
addition of the cable or fiber optic that it desires to install. Thus,
15. Salvaty, 212 Cal Rptr. at 35. See also Hoffman v. Capitol Cablevision Sys., Inc., 383
N.Y.S.2d 674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)(finding easements held by utility company were exclusive
easements in gross which were properly apportioned to cable operator without compensation);
Henley v. Continental Cablevision of St. Louis County, 692 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
Joliff v. Hardin Cable Television Co., 269 N.E.2d 588 (Ohio 1971).
16. 597 So. 2d 683 (Ala. 1992).
17. Id. at 687 (footnote omitted).
18. C/R TV, Inc. v. Shannondale, Inc., 27 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 1994).
19. Id. at 109.
20. Id. The court noted that "[h]aving reached this conclusion under the [apportion of]
easement [claim], we need not reach the question of whether the Cable Communications Policy
Act or the West Virginia Television Cable Systems Act authorize the use of Shannondale's utility
easements over Shannondale's objection." Id. at 110.
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apportionment of easements under state common law appears to be a
viable avenue for a cable operator to gain access to television viewers.
II
Section 621(a)(2) of the Cable Act
Unfortunately, the answer to whether the cable operator can
come in and serve particular customers through particular easements
may have been made more difficult with the enactment and
subsequent interpretation of section 621(a)(2) of the Cable Act.2'
Congress, acting for the public, authorized cable operators to use
compatible easements, including, but not limited to, utility easements.
Section 621(a)(2) declares:
Any franchise shall be construed to authorize the construction of a
cable system over public rights-of-way, and through easements
which is [sic] within the area to be served by the cable system and
which have been dedicated for compatible uses .. .22
The above cited and discussed apportionment of easement cases
z
2
stand for the proposition that once an easement is voluntarily granted
to one entity, another entity that desires to make a like use, which will
not unduly burden the easement or interfere with either the
underlying property owner's use of his land or the easement holder's
use of the easement, may use that easement without effecting a taking
of the property. Thus, the authorization found in section 621(a)(2)
should be viewed as Congress' attempt to relieve cable operators of
the delays and enormous expense inherent in having to litigate every
time it seeks to obtain access to easements and premises. It appears
Congress merely desired to federalize the state common law of
apportionment of easements in enacting section 621(a)(2).
Federal courts, however, are split over the interpretation of this
section of the Cable Act. Most significantly, the courts are split over
how to interpret one particular word within the statute: dedicated.
This split has caused one chief judge of a federal appellate court to
comment: "[W]e now have two rules of law in this circuit concerning
the proper construction of section 621(a)(2). To potential litigants
21. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2)(1994).
22. Id.
23. See also Joliff v. Hardin Cable Television CQ, 269 N.E.2d 588 (Ohio 1971); Hoffman v.
Capitol Cablevision Sys., Ina, 383 N.Y.S.2d 674 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Henley v. Continental
Cablevision of St. Louis County, Inc., 692 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. App. 1985); Witteman v. Jack Berry
Cable TV, 228 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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(and to me) this circuit's interpretation of section 621(a)(2) is
confused."'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Century Southwest Cable
Television, Inc. v. CIIF Associatesz recently addressed this section of
the Cable Act. While the court found that it "need not decide this
disputed question of the meaning of 'dedicated' [because] Century has
offered no evidence of easements within the 12 buildings of the
Apartments which would come under the statute,"' it simply set forth
the dispute in one sentence: "Does the term mean merely 'put aside
for the use' of some body, such as an utility, or does it mean a grant
and a gift of an interest in land for public use?"'
A. The Use of Black's Law Dictionary
The court in Century further noted that "[s]everal ...circuits
have held that Congress chose to use 'dedicated' as the term is used in
real property law, so that there must be a grant for public use for an
easement to be 'dedicated."'" One of those circuit courts was the
Eleventh Circuit in Cable Holdings of Georgia, Inc. v. McNeil Real
Estate Fund VI, Ltd. 9 In that case, the cable operator sought access to
the residents of McNeil's apartment buildingsA° Although several
theories were asserted, the court discussed section 621(a)(2) 1 The
cable operator claimed that the apartment building owner had
privately granted exterior and interior easements, which were
compatible for cable television usage, to ODC (a rival cable operator),
Georgia Power (the electric company), and Southern Bell (the
telephone company).Y Additionally, the cable operator alleged that it
could directly trace, or "piggyback," any of the other cables or wires
already present on the property.' Therefore, the cable operator
argued that it had a right of access under section 621(a)(2) to the
24. Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 988 F.2d 1071, 1082
(11th Cir. 1993)(Tjoflat, C.J. dissenting to court's decision to deny petition for rehearing en
banc)[hereinafter Cable Holdings 111].
25. 33 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1994).
26. Id. at 1071.
27. Id. at 1070.
28. Id. (citations omitted).
29. 953 F.2d 600 (11th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Cable Holdings II].
30. Id. at 601.
31. Id. at 600.
32. Id. at 603. This was the only theory remaining on appeal.
33. Id.
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residents of the apartment buildings. In a series of orders, the district
court ruled in favor of the cable operator.34 The building and
landowner appealed the decisions granting the cable operator access
to the residents to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.35
The appellate court held that
[o]n its face, § 621(a)(2) does not provide the right of access sought
by Smyrna Cable. The provision does provide a right to access
'easements . . . which have been dedicated for compatible uses,' 47
U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (1988), but it does not explicitly include wholly
private easements in the class of easements accessible by franchised
cable companies.
36
To support this conclusion, the court looked to the sixth edition of
Black's Law Dictionary.' Without reference to any legislative history
or to any general statutory construction principles, the court stated
that "Congress's use of the word 'dedicated' at least suggests a
reference to the legal meaning of 'dedication."' The court then cited
Black's for the definition of when an easement is legally "dedicated."'
Consequently, the court held that, "although not dispositive, the
'dedication' language of section 621(a)(2) seems to contradict Smyrna
Cable's alleged right to access the private, non-dedicated easements
which may exist on McNeil's property."39
The Cable Holdings court then turned to the legislative history of
the statute and found that Congress had drafted, but then rejected, a
section of the Cable Act that would have expressly granted the cable
operator the right of access to apartment building tenants sought in
the action.' The court noted that the proposed section 633 would have
granted the cable operator the right to provide service to tenants
within an apartment building even over the objection of the owner of
the building.41 Moreover, the court held that section 633 contained a
34. See, e.g., Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 678 F. Supp.
871, 874 (N.D. Ga. 1986) [hereinafter Cable Holdings I](holding on cross motions for summary
judgment that cable operator has a right of access but only to the extent that its system properly
exercised the right).
35. Cable Holdings 11, 953 F.2d at 603.
36. Id. at 606.
37. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 412 (6th ed. 1990)).
38. Cable Holdings 11, 953 F.2d. at 606 (emphasis added).
39. Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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just compensation provision in recognition of the Supreme Court's
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. decision.4 2
In conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit in Cable Holdings held that
"Section 621 (a)(2) provides a franchised cable company with the right
to access only those easements which have been dedicated for general
utility use, whether by plat recordation for a residential subdivision or
otherwise."'43 Because the easements found on the McNeil property
"were privately granted by McNeil in order to allow limited rights of
access to particular entities ...Smyrna Cable has no right to forcibly
access and occupy these easements. '
A similar stance was taken by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Media General Cable of Fairfax, Inc. v. Sequoyah
Condominium Council of Co-Owners.4 5 In that case, the cable
operator sought access to residents within the condominium complex,
which was comprised of more than 1,000 individual townhouses and
other residential units. Sequoyah had granted specific easements in
favor of the electric and telephone companies and a rival provider of
multi-channel programming services.47 Media General intended to
utilize these and other easements under the Cable Act in order to
install lines to provide cable service to residents of the complex. When
Sequoyah denied its request, Media General sought injunctive relief.
The district court denied relief, holding that the right of access is
limited to easements which have been dedicated for public use and
none of the easements sought to be used by Media General had been
so dedicated.48
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit also followed the Black's Law
Dictionary definition, stating: "the word 'dedicated' has a more
restricted and legally significant definition in the property-law context
than in the layman's vocabulary. It is generally accepted that where
Congress uses technical words, or terms of art, those words are to be
construed by reference to the art or science involved."'49
42. Id.; see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
43. Cable Holdings 11, 953 F.2d at 610.
44. Id.
45. 991 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1993).
46. Id. at 1170-71.
47. Id. The rival company provided similar services to those that a franchised cable
company provides to its customers; however, it was not a franchised cable operator under the
definition found in the Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. § 521(f). Id. at 1170.
48. Id. at 1171.
49. Id. at 1173 (citations omitted).
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Additionally, the Fourth Circuit, like the Eleventh in Cable
Holdings, found the Cable Act's legislative history persuasive,
especially the failure to enact section 633. The court stated that
"[c]areful study of the House Bill as originally proposed and an
understanding of the innerworkings of the statute make it clear that
Congress was trying to achieve two different things in the two
different sections." In brief, the court found that "[t]he focus in § 633
was on the rights of individuals in single residential units . . . [while
§ 621] appears to give franchise holders the ability to make use of
public rights of way and easements which are being used by similar
utilities such as telephone companies and power companies."'
Consequently, four appellate courts have found that section
621(a)(2) does not provide the cable operator with the right to come in
unless the easement has been dedicated to the public and is being used
by a similar utility. According to these appellate courts, the easement,
in order to be used by a franchised cable operator, must be found on a
subdivision plat. An easement that has been granted to a telephone or
electric company, but not dedicated to the public in general or to
general utility use, is a private easemement, even if it has been
recorded and is found in the public records. According to this
interpretation, it is not the type of easement that can be utilized by a
franchised cable operator over the objection of a private land owner
under section 621(a)(2).
B. The Ordinary Meaning of Dedicated
Franchised cable companies have argued that utilizing the
technical or Black's Law Dictionary meaning of dedicated contravenes
the "fundamental canon of statutory construction . . . that unless
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary
contemporaneous common meaning.'51 Section 621(a)(2) does not
state that the compatible use easement must be set aside for "public
use," nor that a "private" easement may not be accessed. Rather, the
easement must merely be set aside for utility or similar use.
Thus, under the common definition of the verb "dedicate," which
is used in the past tense by Congress in section 621(a)(2), the word
50. Id. at 1174. See also Cable Invs., Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151,156 (3d Cir. 1989); TCI of
North Dakota, Inc. v. Schriock Holding Co., 11 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1993).
51. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); see also BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
511 U.S. 531, 536-46 (1994). Additionally, it is the judiciary's function "to apply statutes on the
basis of what Congress has written, not what Congress might have written." United States v.
Great Northern Ry. Co., 343 U.S. 562 (1952).
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means to "set apart for a definite use."'52 Thus, under the common
meaning of the verb "dedicate," an "easement dedicated for
compatible uses" includes any easement which has been set aside,
established, or set apart for utility use.
Such common usage is consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion in its first review of section 621(a)(2). In Centel Cable
Television Co. of Florida v. Admiral's Cove Associates, Ltd.,' Judge
Fay used the word "dedication" interchangeably with the words
"grant," "established," and "obtained," all signifying a nonlegal
meaning. The Court held that: "[h]owever obtained, once an easement
is established for utilities it is well within the authority of Congress to
include cable television as a user. ' Judge Fay also stated: "Admiral's
Cove argue[s] that Congress only authorized cable franchises to place
their cables in publicly owned easements rather than utility
easements. . . We disagree with this line of reasoning."
55
Additionally, Judge Fay found that "the determination by Admiral's
Cove that Congress authorized Centel's use of public easements but
not easements dedicated for use by utilities to be contrary to the
legislative history of the Cable Act."'
In Centel Cable Television Co. of Florida v. Thos. J. White
Development Corp., Chief Judge Roettger specifically held that "[t]he
legislature did not place any special significance on the meaning of the
52. WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 332 (9th ed. 1985). See also AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICIONARY 372 (2d ed. 1982)(defining "dedicate" as "to set apart for a particular use.").
53. 835 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1988). See also Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Burg &
Divosta Corp., 712 F. Supp. 176 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
54. Admiral's Cove, 835 F.2d at 1363 n.7.
55. Id. at 1363 (emphasis added). Judge Fay spent a substantial amount of time discussing
the enactment and intent of the Cable Act. For instance, he found that "[a]n important objective
of the Cable Act was to alleviate the patchwork of federal, state and local laws and regulations
that hampered the growth of cable television. . . . Congress intended the Cable Act to provide
uniformity." Id. at 1363. In discussing "the legal meaning of 'dedication,"' the Cable Holdings
panel generally notes the manner of legally dedicating an easement. Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc.
v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 953 F.2d 600, 606 (11th Cir. 1992). However, each state's
law concerning dedication is different, some being more complex than others. Thus, under the
Cable Holdings scenario, a cable operator must consult the law of dedication of easements in
each particular state and then obtain a legal opinion as to whether a particular developer or
owner of land properly dedicated an easement. The result of this inquiry will be different
depending on which state that particular cable operator is located. Thus, this analysis is in direct
conflict with Admiral's Cove's finding that "Congress intended the Cable Act to provide
uniformity." Admiral's Cove, 835 F.2d at 1363.
56. Id.
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term 'dedicated' over and above its common meaning 'to set aside. '"'I
That decision was affirmed in its entirety by the Eleventh Circuit,'
which panel expressly held that access extended to use of private non-
publicly dedicated roads. 9 Consequently, the Admiral's Cove and
Thos. J. White panels used the word "dedicated" in its ordinary,
common meaning.
Thus not interpreting "dedicated for compatible uses" to apply to
any actual utility easements not only renders Congress' proscription
against private arrangements in section 621(a)(2) a nullity, but also
frustrates the very intent of the section. Contrary to the finding of the
other circuit courts, a review of the legislative history of section
621(a)(2) provides support for using the common meaning of
dedicated.
Subsection 621(a)(2) specifies that any franchise issued to a cable
system authorizes the construction of a cable system over public
rights-of-way, and through easements, which have been dedicated to
compatible uses. This would include, for example, an easement or
right-of-way dedicated for electric, gas or other utility transmission.
Such use is subject to the standards set forth in section 633(b)(1)(A),
(B), and (C). Consideration should also be given to the terms and
conditions under which easements and rights-of-way make use of
them. Any private arrangements which seek to restrict a cable
system's use of such easements or rights-of-way which have been
granted to other utilities are in violation of this section and not
enforceable. 60
There is no mention nor delineation of "publicly dedicated
easements," or "private easements," nor can one be derived by
inference. Thus, Congress' definition of the word "dedicated" is
controlling,61 and must be followed by any court interpreting the
statute. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Admiral's Cove
noted that "[t]he legislative history informs us that Congress intended
to authorize the cable operator to 'piggyback' on easements 'dedicated
57. No. 88-14148-CIV, slip op. at 15 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 1989), affd, 902 F.2d 905 (11th Cir.
1990).
58. See Thos. J. White, 902 F.2d at 911.
59. Id. at 909 (emphasis added).
60. H.R. REP No. 98-934, at 19, 59 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.A.N. 4655, 4696
(emphasis added).
61. See ANR Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 894 F.2d 1396, 1399
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Conoco, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 622 F.2d 796, 798, 800 (5th
Cir. 1980)(construing Natural Gas Policy Act's use of the phrase "committed or dedicated" court
and determining Commission must use NGPA definition).
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for electric, gas or other utility transmission.' 62 The Burg & Divosta
court concluded its discussion on this portion of the section 621
legislative history by declaring that "the Cable Act does not permit a
developer to grant access to one cable operator and to deny it to
another."
63
The decision in Cable TV Fund 14-A, Ltd. v. Property Owners
Association Chesapeake Ranch Estates6l supports this analysis. In that
case, the "defendants contended that North Star-Maryland (a cable
service provider) had an exclusive cable television franchise within the
Estates and that the plaintiff had no right to enter the premises. '" In
granting the cable operator's motion for a preliminary injunction
enjoining the defendants from interfering with its installation of a
cable system at the Estates, the court found that "the only threatened
harm to defendants if the preliminary injunction were granted is the
prospect of competition for cable service within the Estates.IN As
support for that conclusion, the court noted that one of the goals of
the Cable Act, as section 601(6) of the Cable Act states, was to
"promote competition in cable communications." 67 The court then
quoted the legislative history forbidding private arrangementsO Thus,
by granting the injunctive relief requested, the Cable TV Fund 14-A
court held unenforceable the exclusive arrangement to provide cable
service to the residents of the Estates.
Both of the courts in Cable Holdings and Cable Investors v.
Woolley side-stepped this prohibition, stating baldly that this
prohibition "begs the question."' In Cable Holdings, the court found
that the private agreements between the landowner and the utilities
and the other cable provider "do not violate the passage of the
legislative history . . . even though those agreements may effectively
62. Admiral's Cove, 835 F.2d at 1362 n.5.
63. Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Burg & Divosta Corp., 712 F. Supp. 176, 178
(S.D. Fla. 1988).
64. 706 F. Supp. 422 (D. Md. 1989).
65. Id. at 427.
66. The Federal District Court of Maryland also noted that the defendant would lose "what
it characterizes as an 'exclusive' franchise agreement. However, such claimed monopoly is
contrary to both federal and County law." Id. at 433.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeal Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd, 953 F.2d 600, 607
(11th Cir. 1992)[hereinafter Cable Holdings II]; Cable Invs., Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 155
(3d Cir. 1989).
1997] ACCESS TO PREMISES AND EASEMENTS
HASTINGS CoMm/ENT LJ.
exclude Smyrna Cable (the franchised operator)."' However, the
result pronounced by the appellate court in Cable Holdings cannot
stand, since it opens a loophole large enough to devour the entire
thrust of the statute. The Cable Holdings court essentially informs
landowners that to avoid the result intended by Congress, one need
simply enter into "private arrangements" with utility companies and
non-franchised cable operators, granting them "private easements"
which are not placed upon the plat of the subdivision. Such a simple
way to avoid effectuating the purpose of any statute should not be
sanctioned by any court.7'
It is well established that in construing provisions of a statute, a
court has an obligation to accord great deference to the interpretation
adopted by the agency charged with its daily administration.72 The
FCC, has adopted an interpretation of this subsection that is identical
to that put forth by the cable operators. The FCC stated:
Section 621 also authorizes construction of a cable system over
public rights-of-way and through easements designated for
compatible uses such as those used for utilities. Thus, a property
owner that has already granted or is obligated to grant an easement
for utilities cannot deny cable access . . ..
In response to public commentary concerning the use of the word
"designate" by the FCC instead of "dedicated," the FCC stated that:
Our use of the phrase "designated for compatible uses" in the
Notice was not intended to be any more or less encompassing than the
phrase "dedicated for compatible uses" used in the Cable Act. With
respect to the access issue, the House Report states that "[a]ny
private arrangements which seek to restrict a cable system's use of
such easements or rights of way which have been granted to other
utilities are in violation of this section and not enforceable." Based
on the legislative history and the clear language of the statute, we find
that a cable system does have the right to access through an
easement as long as the other conditions are met.
74
Additionally, the Commission noted that "[w]e believe that the
language and provisions of these sections of the Cable Act are
generally self-explanatory and that they need not be codified by our
70. Cable Holdings 11, 953 F.2d at 607.
71. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63,71 (1982).
72. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 598 (1981); Whirlpool Corp. v.
Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
73. Implementing the Provisions of the Cable Communications Act of 1984, 49 Fed. Reg.
48,765,48,768 (1984)(emphasis added).
74. Implementations of the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 50
Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,647 (1985)(emphasis added).
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rules."7 5 Again, there is no distinction drawn between "public" versus
"private" easements in the FCC's discussion. As further support, soon
after the enactment of the Cable Act, the National League of Cities
and U.S. Conference of Mayors published A Local Government Guide
to the New Law, entitled Cable Franchising and Regulation. In
discussing section 621(a)(2) of the Cable Act, the Guide states: "This
provision is intended to eliminate the legal problems operators have
confronted over access to utility easements (particularly, in some
midwestern and western states), by making clear that cable franchises
will be deemed to authorize construction of cable facilities in utility
easements."'76 Additionally, the Guide, in a footnote to the above cited
paragraph, states that "[i]t is significant that this provision indicates a
congressional intent to confer authority which may not otherwise exist
under state or local law."
''
Thus, all those involved in the enactment of the Cable Act, i.e.,
Congress in its legislative history, the Federal Communications
Commission in its Rules to Implement the Cable Act, and the
franchising authorities in their Local Government Guide, unanimously
agree that the intent of section 621(a)(2) of the Cable Act was to allow
cable operators access to two separate and distinct areas to build their
cable systems: (1) public rights-of-way; and (2) easements which have
been dedicated to compatible uses, including, for example, an
easement set aside for electric, gas or other utility transmission.'
Conversely, none of those involved ever made mention of restricting
cable franchisees to easements "dedicated" to the public and
prohibiting cable franchisees from "private" easements.
The statutory construction used by circuit courts that have found
section 621(a)(2) to effect a taking of private property is not only
improper and incorrect, but effectively negates the purpose and effect
of section 621(a)(2). As stated earlier, the final form of the Cable Act
was the result of intense negotiations and compromises between
representatives of the franchising authorities and the cable operators,
the parties most knowledgeable of what is contained in a franchise.79
75. Id.
76. National League of Cities and United States Conference of Mayors, A LOCAL
GOVERNMENT GUIDE TO THE NEW LAW: CABLE FRANCHISING AND REGULATION, at III-E-5 (1985);
see also id. at 11-20.
77. Id. at III-E-5 n.5 (emphasis added).
78. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 59 (1984).
79. Section 602(8) defines the term "franchise" as "an initial authorization or renewal
thereof . . . issued by a franchising authority." 47 U.S.C. § 522(9)(1994).
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These parties and Congress knew that most, if not all, cable television
franchises already' permit the cable operator to use public rights-of-
way and public easements to install its cable system. s "But this power
to franchise would be meaningless unless the city could assure its
franchisees that the [franchise] it grants carries with it the power over
the public and private property necessary to construct a cable system.
That power is granted in Section 621(a) (2) of the Act."81
Therefore, interpreting the Cable Act to allow franchised cable
operators to use only those easements dedicated to a "public use," and
not to "private" easements, effectively negates this provision of the
Cable Act because it would then grant franchised operators no more
rights than what they already have received pursuant to their
franchises. Such an anti-competitive and limiting construction also
frustrates the purpose and intent of this provision of the Cable Act.'
A critical conclusion reached by the circuit courts to deny access
to cable operators is based upon a reliance on the Supreme Court's
holding in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.83 A review
of Loretto, though, is misplaced because Loretto dealt with a state
regulation mandating attachment of cable wires to a building without
the owner's consent. In essence, the regulation in Loretto required the
property owner to create an easement for cable use. 84 Section
621(a)(2) of the Cable Act contains no such mandate forcing the
creation of an easement. Section 621 clearly deals with easements
already in existence, stating that a franchised cable operator's
construction of a cable system through [utility] easements "which [are]
within the area to be served" can only occur in easements "which have
been" set aside or established for compatible uses.'
Consequently, Loretto does not apply to the situation in which a
cable system has been, or seeks to be, constructed and installed by a
franchised cable operator within pre-existing utility or other
80. See, e.g., D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO:
LAW AND POLICY § 3.03, 3-27 (1985).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 70 (1982)("Statutes should be
interpreted to avoid untenable distinctions and unreasonable results whenever possible." The
Court found that the reading by EEOC "would make [§703(h)] illegal to adopt, and in practice to
apply .... "); Mester Mfg. Co. v. INS, 879 F.2d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 1989); Bechtel Constr., Inc. v.
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 812 F.2d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1987)("Legislative
enactments should never be construed as establishing statutory schemes that are illogical.
83. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
84. See id. at 436-38.
85. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (1994).
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compatible use easements which have already been established,
voluntarily set aside, or granted by the property owner. Moreover, the
Loretto Court expressly limited its holding to the facts in that case by
explaining that its decision "is very narrow."86 Unlike the situation in
which a cable operator seeks use of a non-dedicated utility easement,
Loretto did not involve use of any pre-existing interior or exterior
easements dedicated for use by utilities. Thus, based upon factual
differences between these two situations, the fact that Loretto was
decided before the enactment of the Cable Act, and that the Loretto
Court itself declared its decision was "very narrow," the Loretto
decision is clearly inapplicable to section 621(a)(2).
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court, in one of its latest
opinions interpreting the Fifth Amendment takings issue, appears to
have sanctioned section 621(a)(2)'s apportionment of pre-existing
easements to franchised cable operators. In Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,' the Court addressed an alleged regulatory
deprivation of beachfront property by the enactment of the state's
Beachfront Management Act, which barred the owner of property
from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his parcel. Lucas
filed suit alleging that the Act had deprived him of all "economically
viable use" of his property. The Court held that "when the owner of
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good . . . he has suffered
a taking."' Later in his opinion, Justice Scalia spoke of "permanent
physical occupations" of land, such as those addressed in Loretto, and
noted that the Court has "refused to allow the government to decree it
anew (without compensation), no matter how weighty the asserted
'public interest' involved. . .. "I Justice Scalia, however, noted that
"we assuredly would permit the government to assert a permanent
easement that was a pre-existing limitation on the landowner's title."'
Consequently, it follows that the Supreme Court has approved section
621(a)(2)'s apportionment of a pre-existing easement by the
government.9 Thus, section 621(a)(2) does not render a taking of a
landowner's property.
86. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added).
87. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
88. Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 1028.
90. Id. at 1028-29.
91. See C/R TV, Inc. v. Shannondale, Inc., 27 F.3d 104, 108-09 (4th Cir. 1994)(holding
easement for telephone wire is substantially compatible for use by cable company).
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C. The Split in the Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit has faced a cable operator's action for
access under section 621(a)(2) three separate times. The first two
times, in Admiral's Cove' and Thos. J. White,' the court found on
behalf of the cable operator. However, in the third and most recent
case, Cable Holdings,' the court found in favor of the landowner. The
court attempted to differentiate Cable Holdings from Admiral's Cove
and Thos. J. White because the developer privately granted easements
to particular entities-Southern Bell, Georgia Power and ODC-and
did not dedicate the easements to utility use in general.' Therefore,
reasoned the panel, these easements were private, and not the type of
easements Congress intended to include within section 621.16
However, a careful review of the facts of Admiral's Cove and
Thos. J. White reveals that the essential nature of the easements at
issue in those cases were the same as in Cable Holdings. In each of the
cases, easements were granted to a power company, a telephone
company, and a private television company or water company. In
Admiral's Cove, the developer granted easements and rights-of-way to
particular entities which were later recorded on the plat of the
Admiral's Cove Development. 97 In Thos. J. White, the developer
likewise granted easements to particular entities-Florida Power &
Light and Southern Bell, which were on the recorded plat of the
development, and to St. Lucie West Utilities, Inc. 8 Other easements
granted to the utilities were not platted.' In both cases, the easements
were all privately negotiated and granted to particular entities. The
easements in Admiral's Cove and Thos. J. White were not of the type
dedicated "to utility use in general." The decision of the Cable
Holdings panel cannot be reconciled with the Eleventh Circuit's prior
decisions, and that court should have reheard en banc and vacated the
92. Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Admiral's Cove Assocs., Ltd., 835 F.2d 1359 (11th
Cir. 1988).
93. Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905 (11th Cir.
1990).
94. Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 953 F.2d 600 (11th
Cir. 1990)[hereinafter Cable Holdings II].
95. Id. at 608-09.
96. Id. at 609.
97. Admiral's Cove, 835 F.2d at 1360.
98. Thos. J. White, 902 F.2d at 907.
99. Centel Cable Television of Fla. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., No. 88-14148-CIV, slip op.
at 8-9 (S. D. Fla. Feb. 28, 1989).
[VOL. 19:431
Cable Holdings decision in order to secure the uniformity of the
circuit's opinions interpreting this portion of the Cable Act.
The Eleventh Circuit in both Admiral's Cove and Thos. J. White
faced the argument that Congress only authorized the use of public
easements rather than utility easements and questioned whether an
authorization to use utility easements would be an unconstitutional
taking under Loreno. When delineating the parameters of the
substantive right of access granted to a franchised cable operator
pursuant to section 621(a)(2) of the Cable Act, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the landowners' arguments and determined that Congress
could authorize the use of utility easements. Judge Fay in Admiral's
Cove stated:
Since most developers voluntarily grant easements for use by
utilities, however, Congress may force the developer to allow a cable
franchise to use the easement without offending the taking clause
[sic] of the Constitution. Such "voluntary" action by developers may
be an integral part of zoning procedures or the obtaining of
necessary permits. However obtained, once an easement is
established for utilities it is well within the authority of Congress to
include cable television as a user.
10°
The court in Thos. J. White reexamined and reaffirmed this
precedent, stating "White's Takings Clause argument must be rejected
under Admiral's Cove."''1 Later, the Eleventh Circuit in Cable
Holdings appeared to narrow the holding of both Admiral's Cove and
Thos. J. White by finding that the Cable Act only authorizes use by a
cable franchisee to dedicated easements, not "private, non-dedicated
easements" granted to a particular utility.1'
However, the findings of the Cable Holdings court have been
questioned by a district court in California facing the exact same
situation,' and by four Eleventh Circuit Judges, including the chief
judge, who voted in favor of rehearing en banc.1 Chief Judge Tjoflat,
100. Admiral's Cove, 835 F.2d at 1363 n.7 (citation omitted).
101. Thos. J. White, 902 F.2d at 910.
102. Cable Holdings II, 953 F.2d at 609.
103. Heritage Cablevision of California, Inc. v. J.F. Shea Co., Inc., No. C-90-20073-WAI,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8738, at *4 n.1 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 1992)(denial of defendants' motion for
modification and/or clarification)("Cable Holdings is arguable [sic] in direct conflict with two
other Eleventh Circuit cases, and failed to cite any other easement co-use case.").
104. Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 988 F.2d 1071, 1071
(11th Cir. 1993)(Tjoflat, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)[hereinafter Cable
Holdings Ill].
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in summarizing the reason for his dissent from the decision to deny
rehearing en banc, stated:
[W]hile the panel reaches its result by distinguishing two Eleventh
Circuit decisions, it does so based on an erroneous interpretation of
the facts in these cases. On the face of its opinion, therefore, the
panel appears fairly to read and distinguish our precedent. Yet,
when the panel's interpretations are laid along side the facts of Thos.
J. White and Admiral's Cove, the force of these prior decisions
becomes apparent. Correctly represented, our prior cases cannot be
distinguished. Moreover, had the panel followed Thos. J. White and
Admiral's Cove, it would have been compelled to reach a different





Unfortunately, for an attorney for cable operators seeking
counsel as to whether they can have access to certain television
watchers through the use of utility easements, the state of the law is
different depending on where the operator is doing business. One can
be more optimistic in California than in most other locations, based
upon cases decided in state and federal courts in California.
1°6
However, operators in states comprising the federal Third, Fourth,
and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal have reason to be skeptical of
their chances to obtain access rights under section 621(a)(2). Finally,
with respect to operators in Florida, Alabama, and Georgia, the states
comprising the Eleventh Circuit, practitioners need to know whether
the facts are more like Admiral's Cove and Thos. J. White, or like
Cable Holdings before rendering an opinion. However, such a review
of the facts of the case and comparing them to the three previously-
decided cases of the Eleventh Circuit may not be sufficient. In sum,
Chief Judge Tjoflat was certainly correct when he stated that the state
of the law concerning access to easements is "confused.' '1°
One possible solution to this confusion that would allow the cable
operator in would be to amend section 621(a)(2). The suggested
105. Id. at 1071. This conflict prompted Chief Judge Tjoflat to state: "this circuit's
interpretation of section 621(a)(2) is confused." Id. at 1082.
106. See Salvaty v. Falcon Cable Television, 212 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985);
Witteman v. Jack Barry Cable TV, 228 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Century Southwest
Cable Television, Inc. v. CIIF Assocs., 33 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1994); Heritage Cablevision of Cal.,
Inc. v. J.F. Shea Co., Inc., No. D-90-20073-WAI (N.D. Cal. May 21, 1992).
107. Cable Holdings III, 988 F.2d at 1082 (petition for rehearing).
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amendment is a simple one word swap. Borrowing from the.FCC's
Notice of Implementation of the Commission's Rules to Implement
Provisions of the Cable Communications Act of 1984,11 the word
"dedicated" is stricken and substituted with the word "designated." As
a result, the argument over whether to apply the common, ordinary
use or the Black's Law Dictionary definition of a word is obviated.
This simple amendment should provide cable operators with greater
access to easements, which in turn will provide them with greater
access to potential subscribers. Greater access should result in greater
competition between franchised cable operators and non-franchised
providers of Cable service such as SMATV and MMDS operators,
which is what the 1992 Cable Act was enacted to accomplish.
108. 49 Fed. Reg. 48,768 (1984).
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